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Since an accused is innocent until proven guilty, 
s/he may be released on bail when certain 
conditions, set out in law, are met. In South 
Africa, bail is a constitutional right afforded in 
terms of section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution. 
Courts exercise profound discretion where bail 
applications are concerned.1 This discretion 
Prisons have been a major player in all countries with a history of tyrannical regimes, as people who 
attempted to resist repression frequently found themselves detained in prisons. Many countries 
have adopted democratic government, underscored by equality of all people before the law. Many 
states – South Africa among them – continue to make reforms to address these past injustices, and, 
as part of this shift, prisons across continents are attempting to decolonise. This article questions 
whether South Africa can decolonise its prisons, given that the country’s poor are at a higher risk of 
detention because they are not able to afford bail. The article focuses on the concept of cashless 
bail and argues that, given South Africa’s history of marginalisation and income inequality, this model 
can be one mechanism through which to address past injustices with a view to decolonising the 
country’s prisons. The article makes a strong case for the effective implementation of provisions on 
inquiry on affordability of cash bail as one of the means to achieve this end.
notwithstanding, the process demands of 
courts to engage in a balancing act: in arriving 
at decisions on whether or not to grant bail, the 
court has to balance the interests of society, 
the accused and the victim(s) to ensure that the 
interests of justice are served.2 
Since bail is a constitutional right, it may be 
reasonable to expect, at least on the face 
of it, that accused individuals would be able 
to access bail relatively easily. However, 
the challenge of bail affordability introduces 
enormous complexity. The law requires that 
judicial officers must inquire into the affordability 
of bail for the accused.3 Ideally, judicial officers 
are mandated to conduct this affordability 
inquiry, based, among others, on the accused’s 
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access to the money necessary to pay bail. 
These provisions may lead one to reasonably 
conclude that, even for the poor in society, 
there are no apparent anomalies in accessing 
this right. 
Unfortunately, these inquiries are often not 
conducted. In addition to the courts’ mandate 
to make inquiries, they can also grant bail 
subject to ‘special conditions’, for example, 
requiring the accused to report to a specified 
authority or person at a specified place and 
time.4 However, these options are seldom 
explored. Thus, although the application for 
bail itself is often successful, challenges arise 
when the accused cannot afford to pay the bail 
amount. Lines are therefore clearly demarcated 
between rich and poor, and bail applications 
often disproportionately affect poor and 
disadvantaged communities and fail to advance 
the broader goal of equality. This challenge 
is exacerbated by South Africa’s high levels 
of inequality, which are rooted in the history 
of subjugation, marginalisation, racism and 
discrimination against black South Africans.5 
Failure to raise the required funds to secure 
bail affects not only the accused but also the 
Department of Correctional Services, among 
others, because accused persons who cannot 
pay bail must be detained in a correctional 
facility. De Ruiter and Hardy6 show that the 
inability to pay bail money contributes to the 
congestion of correctional facilities, with the 
poor constituting the highest percentage 
of those detained because of an inability to 
pay cash bail. Dissel and Ellis7 argue that the 
large number of people without the assets or 
income necessary to secure their freedom from 
detention further exacerbates the problem of 
overcrowding in prisons. 
Significant strides have been made in reforming 
South Africa’s correctional services in the 
post-apartheid era.8 During apartheid, prisons 
(as they were referred to at the time) mainly 
housed black inmates, the majority of whom 
were detained under apartheid legislation for 
breaking the laws that upheld the apartheid 
regime and discriminated against black South 
Africans.9 The end of apartheid and South 
Africa’s transition to democracy signalled 
the dawn of a new era anchored in equality, 
and encompassing, among other things, the 
redress of past injustices. Laws that formed the 
basis for detaining black citizens were repealed 
in favour of a constitutional dispensation 
founded on values such as equality and dignity.
Other, more practical reforms have also been 
implemented. For example, the criminal 
justice system now uses modern technology 
to effectively manage day-to-day operations, 
reduce costs, eliminate waste, and automate 
paper-intensive systems.10 These reforms are 
praiseworthy, and the criminal justice system’s 
orientation has certainly shifted since apartheid. 
But the question remains as to whether it has 
sufficiently decolonised, given the rampant 
inequality in South African society. Have we 
properly considered the question of affordability 
of bail, and taken account of the ways in which 
cash bail is a criminalisation of poverty for 
the majority of South Africans? What are the 
implications of this for the rights guaranteed 
under our Constitution?
This article considers these questions, 
and argues for a thorough inquiry into the 
affordability of bail as a mechanism through 
which to reform prisons in South Africa. To this 
end, the article begins with an examination of 
decolonisation and bail from both a national 
and international perspective. The article 
then shows how bail without proper inquiry 
disadvantages the poor, and ultimately 
undermines the decolonisation goal. The
article concludes by making a case for a 
deliberate and systematic inquiry into the 
affordability of bail, to ensure that the poor are 
not prejudiced.
33SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 66 • DECEMBER 2018
Decolonisation, bail and the law
Despite being the subject of considerable 
scholarly attention, there is little consensus 
on what decolonisation means. Given this 
contestation, it is particularly critical to map out 
the parameters of its meaning in so far as this 
article is concerned.
Himonga and Diallo define decolonisation as ‘a 
move from a hegemonic or Eurocentric 
conception of law connected to legal cultures 
historically rooted in colonialism (and apartheid) 
in Africa to more inclusive legal cultures’.11 In 
conceptualising decolonisation, commentators 
also draw insight from the history of 
colonisation and apartheid, and emphasise the 
subjugation of black people during both eras.12 
Decolonisation therefore demands that this 
history of subjugation and past injustice not 
only be acknowledged, but also addressed.13 
The process of redress may entail, among 
others, a dismantling of existing structures that 
continue to advance the subjugation and 
injustice experienced by the marginalised 
during the colonial and apartheid eras.14 
However, in deconstructing and ultimately 
reconstructing structures and systems, some 
scholars insist that a complete overthrow of all 
existing structures and systems would be 
unrealistic.15 This is because (despite the need 
to address past injustices and dismantle 
Eurocentric machinery), recourse to structures 
remains critical to responding to the problems 
and people that these very structures aim 
to address. 
From the perspective of prisons, decolonisation 
requires approaches that seek to address 
past injustices in correctional facilities and 
the criminal justice system at large. The goal 
of decolonisation in corrections, therefore, 
is to ensure that the injustices suffered by 
marginalised groups during the colonial and 
apartheid eras are effectively addressed. Bail 
affordability becomes a key site for decolonising 
the criminal justice system, because it holds 
the promise that accused persons can be given 
due regard in every decision pertaining to the 
application of bail.
Understanding bail: international and 
national perspectives
Bail is explicitly provided for under South African 
law. Although international law does not explicitly 
make provision for the concept of bail, various 
international treaties contain provisions which, if 
progressively interpreted, could give due regard 
to accused persons who cannot afford to be 
released on bail due to poverty. Fortunately, 
South Africa’s Constitution contains provisions 
which demand that appropriate weight is 
accorded to international law. For example, in 
terms of section 39 of the Constitution, courts 
are mandated to consider international law in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights. Sections 231 and 
232 also elaborate on the role and place of 
international treaties and customary international 
law in South Africa’s legal framework.  
From an international law perspective, there 
are standards that lend impetus to the cause 
of release of those accused of crime, pending 
their trial, despite not being an internationally 
accepted default practice.16 South Africa ratified 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) in 1998 and this convention 
envisages the right to bail based on the fact that 
it guarantees the right to liberty and outlaws 
arbitrary arrest and detention.17 Article 9(3) of 
the ICCPR provides that it is not a general rule 
that persons awaiting trial should be detained; 
however, release may be subject to guarantees 
to appear for trial. According to the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee,18 this 
provision may suggest that detention should be 
a measure of last resort, save for exceptional 
circumstances such as a likelihood that the 
accused would abscond or destroy evidence, 
influence witnesses, or flee from the jurisdiction 
of the trial court. 
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The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, to which South Africa is a party, also 
stands against arbitrary arrests.19 In 2014, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights adopted Guidelines on the Conditions 
of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial 
Detention in Africa (the Luanda Guidelines), 
which address a number of issues, including 
unnecessary and arbitrary arrest, and pre-trial 
detention. The guidelines are alive to the fact 
that pre-trial detentions contribute profoundly 
to the overcrowding of prisons in Africa. Prison 
overcrowding is exacerbated by the fact that 
sufficient inquiry is not always held into the 
affordability of bail for the poor, who often cannot 
afford bail money and end up in detention. 
Moreover, in terms of the Luanda Guidelines, 
pre-trial detention is conceptualised as a 
measure of last resort to be used in the absence 
of other alternatives.20 Given that international 
law is inclined towards release of those accused 
pending trial, it is arguably also against any acts 
or omissions leading to unnecessary pre-trial 
detention. The inability to afford to pay bail is one 
such consideration.
Detention and the granting of bail in 
South Africa
Section 38 of the Criminal Procedure Act21 
provides for arrest as one of the ways of 
securing attendance of an accused in court for 
purposes of trial. However, one has a right to 
apply for release from custody pending trial. 
In terms of section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution, 
every person who is arrested for allegedly 
committing an offence has a right to be released 
from detention if the interests of justice permit, 
subject to reasonable conditions.22 Black’s 
law dictionary defines bail as the release of 
a prisoner after a deposit of security.23 The 
Criminal Procedure Act provides that an accused 
may be released from custody upon payment 
of, or guaranteeing to pay, the sum of money 
determined for his bail.24 This provision already 
sets the tone that bail must be paid in monetary 
form, although it suggests that alternatively, a 
valuable asset might be dispensed with by the 
accused. In reality, however, release on bail is 
impossible without access to money – in other 
words, for most detained people in South 
Africa, where over half of the population is poor, 
and where poverty is on the rise.25  
With these figures in mind, it is crucial that 
inquiries into accused persons’ ability to pay are 
consistently conducted to ensure the effective 
decolonisation of prisons. Failure or omission to 
inquire would arguably be akin to punishment, 
even though the requirements of bail were 
never intended to constitute punishment 
or discrimination against the accused. It is 
precisely for this reason that the overarching 
issue in assessing whether or not bail is granted 
is the extent to which it serves the interests 
of justice, in addition to considerations such 
as whether the accused constitutes a flight 
risk.26 The Criminal Procedure Act further 
stipulates that accused persons may be 
released on warning in lieu of bail when they 
are in custody in connection with an offence 
that is not contained in Part II or Part III of 
Schedule 2, and which qualifies for bail.27 
However, this list of offences in Schedule 2 is 
broad, and includes crimes such as treason, 
murder, rape, sexual offences against children 
or the mentally disabled, robbery, kidnapping 
and housebreaking with intent to commit an 
offence. This means that bail is the sole option 
for most accused persons. Where an inquiry 
into affordability is not conducted, correctional 
facilities end up crowded with the indigent while 
those who can afford bail (the wealthy) remain 
at large, regardless of the gravity of 
their offence(s). 
The prerequisites for securing bail in 
South Africa 
Upon application, the presiding officer should 
grant bail, if the interests of justice permit.28 The 
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question of what constitutes the ‘interests of 
justice’ must be determined by the courts,29 but 
release of the accused will not be permitted in 
the following situations:30
(a)  Where there is the likelihood that the 
accused, if he or she were released on bail, 
will endanger the safety of the public or any 
particular person or will commit a schedule 
1 offence; or
(b)  Where there is the likelihood that the 
accused, if he or she were released on bail, 
will attempt to evade his or her trial; or 
(c)  Where there is the likelihood that the 
accused, if he or she were released on 
bail will attempt to influence or intimidate 
witnesses or to conceal or destroy 
 evidence; or 
(d) Where there is the likelihood that the 
accused, if he or she were released on bail, 
will undermine or jeopardise the objectives 
or the proper functioning of the criminal 
justice system, including the bail system; or
(e)  Where in exceptional circumstance there is 
the likelihood that the release of the accused 
will disturb the public order, or undermine 
the public peace or security.
The implication of these requirements is that 
bail should be granted where an accused 
makes an application, and none of the grounds 
listed above is present. A bail application is, 
however, frequently described as a two-stage 
inquiry.31 The first inquiry determines whether 
it is in the interests of justice to grant bail. This 
was emphasised in the cases of S v Dlamini, 
S v Dladla, S v Joubert and S v Schietekat,32 
which held that pre-trial arrestees are entitled 
to be released on reasonable conditions if the 
interests of justice permit. The second stage of 
the inquiry is to establish the amount of money 
to be paid by the accused. Here the presiding 
officer has to consider the amount that the 
applicant can afford. In terms of section 60 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, the mandate of 
determining the bail amount rests with the court. 
The Act, however, does not provide specific 
criteria for determining the bail amount. As such, 
this is mostly omitted by the courts, thereby 
jeopardising the rights of accused persons who 
are too poor to be able to pay monetary bail.
There is divergence in commentaries regarding 
the factors which ought to be taken into 
account in determining the bail amount. Karth,33 
for instance, contends that the amount is not 
determined by the severity of the crime. Rather, 
the court is to assess whether the likelihood 
of forfeiting the amount of money is sufficiently 
severe to guarantee the accused’s return to 
court.34 Bates,35 drawing on some of South 
Africa’s high-profile cases that address the 
issue of bail, argues on the other hand that the 
presiding officer must consider the seriousness 
of the charge and the interests of justice in the 
granting of bail. Among the cases he analysed 
to reinforce his point are those against high-
profile murder accused Shrien Dewani and 
Oscar Pistorius.36 He used these cases to 
conclude that although release on bail has a lot 
to do with financial means, the seriousness of 
the offence also plays a critical role. Bates’s view 
is supported by Ulrich, who is of the opinion 
that bail can be set at hundreds of rands, 
depending on the offence, and that the amount 
is subject to the presiding officer’s discretion.37 
Considered together, what exactly should count 
for purposes of determining the bail amount 
remains controversial. However, what is clear 
is the fact that when bail money is set too high, 
the indigent in society are affected the most. 
Omission of inquiry: a hindrance to 
indigents’ rights and decolonisation 
of prisons 
Section 60(2B) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
mandates the judiciary to conduct a separate 
inquiry into the ability of the accused to pay bail. 
If the accused cannot afford bail, the court is to 
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consider non-financial bail options or set bail at 
a price cognisant of the circumstances of the 
accused. Non-compliance with this mandatory 
probe has impeded the administration of bail 
in South Africa, and has consequently become 
a stumbling block in the realisation of the right 
to bail. Failure to inquire about the affordability 
of bail often undermines the findings of the 
first-stage bail application inquiry into whether 
the interests of justice permit release. This is 
because the accused gets detained without 
any effort on the court’s part to inquire about 
the accused’s financial ability. The Judicial 
Inspectorate of Prisons Annual Report38 
has highlighted this problem, arguing that 
non-affordability of bail is a major cause of 
overcrowding in prisons. This is exacerbated 
by the tendency of courts to set unrealistically 
high bail amounts. The report recommended 
a re-examination of this practice, based on 
the fact that bail should not be confused with 
a fine for an offence. High bail amounts pose 
challenges to the poor and disadvantaged, 
and consequently undermine the interests of 
justice. This resonates with Van der Berg’s 
argument that bail in South Africa operates as 
‘privilege prejudicial to the poor’.39 This state 
of affairs underscores the need for the criminal 
justice system to make a concerted effort to 
inquire into accused persons’ ability to pay bail 
money, short of which, the inequality inherited 
from the apartheid and colonial eras will 
continue to thrive. 
A 2014 study by the Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies (CALS) into adherence with the legal 
framework for bail found that courts mainly 
do not inquire about the accused’s ability to 
pay bail.40 Leslie adds that judicial officers are 
usually reluctant to conduct these inquiries, due 
to the difficulties in assessing and verifying the 
accused’s financial standing, and the lack of 
clearly defined procedures guiding the inquiry.41 
The Criminal Procedure Act stipulates that 
appropriate conditions, that do not include 
money, must be considered for release of those 
accused who cannot afford bail.42 Indeed, 
some accused who are given non-financial 
bail43 do not appear in court for trial,44 which 
may prejudice the court against a mechanism 
that is effectively designed to help the indigent. 
Because of this, some judicial officers prefer to 
err on the side of caution, and thus ensure that 
accused persons appear in court, rather than 
risk them jumping bail.45 However, presupposing 
that all accused have the same dishonourable 
intentions impacts negatively on those indigent 
accused who are committed to appear for trial. 
Section 63A of the Criminal Procedure Act 
adds another layer of redress for accused 
persons who cannot afford bail money. In terms 
of this section, an accused person who has 
been granted bail, but is unable to pay, can 
be released by the head of prison on warning. 
This, however, is on condition that the prison 
population is reaching such proportions that it 
constitutes a material and imminent threat to 
the human dignity, physical health or safety of 
an accused. It could be argued that section 63A 
affords relief to accused persons who cannot 
afford bail. The limitation is that the discretion of 
the head of a prison can only be invoked when 
prisons are overcrowded, so when they are not, 
there is no reprieve for the accused. 
Section 63A(1) was never intended to advance 
the interests of the indigent accused. If 
anything, it serves the interests of the prison 
facilities, since it is only invoked to relieve the 
burden on correctional facilities. Even with 
section 63A(1) in place, accused persons 
routinely remain in custody when they cannot 
afford the stipulated bail amount, despite 
findings that releasing them would serve the 
interests of justice. Given that the largest 
proportion of people in pre-trial detention are 
from poor backgrounds, many of whom belong 
to groups that are socially, economically and 
politically discriminated against,46 this finding 
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should hardly be surprising. Can we therefore 
speak of decolonisation when the poor and 
the marginalised continue to suffer the brunt 
of pre-trial detention, while the wealthy tend to 
enjoy their liberty? Even taking into account the 
impact that the nature of the crime has on the 
outcome of bail application, the odds remain 
stacked against the accused at the second 
stage of the inquiry, where one’s financial status 
determines whether or not one will be detained. 
Failure to conduct an affordability inquiry has 
become a default filtering tool that determines 
who is released pending trial, and unfairly 
disadvantages and discriminates against the 
indigent accused.47
Thus, with the glaring structural inequalities in 
South Africa, it is apparent that bail has become 
punitive to the poor. Leslie remarks that: 
[W]e have a system whereby an indigent 
shoplifter will be remanded for being 
unable to afford a small amount of bail 
money, whereas a businessman who 
stole millions can afford his huge bail 
and will not be remanded. There is, 
therefore, an inconsistency in the way 
bail is applied. Bail serves as a mistress 
to those with money.48 
Hopkins further notes that ‘when an indigent 
South African is arrested, however, the cogs 
of the court system turn incredibly slow, 
and seemingly not much heed is paid to the 
principles of a fair trial’.49 On the face of it, it 
does then appear that money is being used as a 
tool to discriminate against the poor. 
The indigent accused is disadvantaged not 
only in terms of the amount of bail set by the 
court but also by the factors that are taken 
into account in assessing whether or not the 
accused is a flight risk. Notably, among the 
factors that the courts consider is whether 
the accused has permanent employment 
or owns valuable assets (see, for example, 
Madi and Mabhenxa in this edition). Accused 
persons who meet these requirements are less 
likely to be deemed a potential flight risk than 
their indigent counterparts.50 It is, therefore, 
apparent that accused persons who are poor 
tend to be disproportionately prejudiced by 
the implementation of the bail system. This is 
itself discriminatory to the indigent accused. 
The fact that the possession of valuable assets 
and money remains a major consideration 
in arriving at an assessment of flight risk not 
only disadvantages the indigent but also has 
adverse effects on the dignity and other rights of 
accused persons who are poor.51 
Three cases make this point. In S v 
Masoanganye,52 three accused were charged 
with, among others, the offence of theft. One 
of the three accused was tried separately 
after being granted bail, and the other two 
co-accused were refused bail because the 
trial judge was not satisfied that the appellants 
were not a flight risk, as they did not have 
sufficient assets registered under their names. 
The accused who was granted bail was 
considered not to be a flight risk, merely 
because he possessed valuable assets.53 The 
matter was ultimately appealed in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (SCA), which adopted a more 
progressive approach in overturning the High 
Court decision:
[T]he trial court apparently failed to 
consider that the personal circumstances 
of an accused – much more than assets 
– determine whether the accused is a 
flight risk. Had the court considered the 
personal circumstances of the appellants, 
the SCA held, it would have been satisfied 
that they were not a flight risk.54 
The point, however, is that similar rulings remain 
pervasive, clearly denoting how one’s means 
are used to determine whether or not one is 
a flight risk. S v Letaoana addressed a similar 
issue.55 In this case, the accused was a scholar 
who resided with his parents and owned no real 
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assets of value except a bed and his clothing. 
The investigating officer in the case testified 
that if the accused did not return to court, he 
would not know where to find him. The stance 
of the investigating officer is highly problematic. 
Making asset possession a requirement for 
bail for a 20-year-old schoolboy who, like most 
of his peers, does not own property or any 
valuable assets in his own name, is not only 
discriminatory and unreasonable, it also strikes 
at the core of South African constitutional 
values of equality and dignity. Not coincidentally, 
the court in Letaoana ruled that ‘to take into 
account the minimal assets possessed by 
an accused as a factor for refusing bail is 
tantamount to imposing a penalty for poverty’.56
The Letaoana case, though decided in the 
democratic era, underscores the ignorance 
and unwillingness of criminal justice 
professionals, including investigating officers, 
to take cognisance of the practical realities that 
ordinary and disadvantaged South Africans 
have to contend with. This is an indication 
that the criminal justice system still harbours 
discriminatory views, many of which directly 
impact the prison system and undermine 
the decolonisation of our prisons. This is 
tantamount to the criminalisation of poverty, 
and it appears that it is offensive to be poor in 
so far as bail applications are concerned. Omar 
affirms this conclusion, contending that such 
a trend remains problematic and ignores the 
need for justice and fairness in what remains 
a very unequal society.57 It is submitted that 
unless there are reasons to believe that the 
accused will evade trial, a lack of ownership 
of assets is a discriminatory basis for denying 
bail.58 It undermines the equality clause, and 
can hardly be justified in South Africa’s free and 
democratic society.59 
Looking forward: cashless bail?
Alternative ways should be considered to 
resolve the issue of whether or not an accused 
person is a flight risk. The decision in the case 
of S v Pineiro,60 though not focused on indigent 
accused, addresses the viability of alternative 
means to ensure that accused attend trial 
once released on bail. In the Pineiro case, the 
applicants, who were citizens of Spain, were 
denied bail because their risk of absconding 
from trial was high. Despite this risk, the 
appeals judge considered other ways to deal 
with the issue, without resorting to keeping 
the accused in detention. Bail was granted to 
the applicants subject to certain conditions, 
notable among which were that the accused 
had to report to a specified police station once 
a day, had to hand over their passports to the 
police, and also could not leave specified areas 
without reporting to the police. This decision 
shows that pre-trial detention can remain a 
matter of last resort if courts creatively consider 
alternative means to securing the attendance 
of the accused. This stance resonates with, 
and would be a furtherance of, section 35(1)
(f) of the Constitution, which underscores 
that ‘[e]veryone who is arrested for allegedly 
committing an offence has the right to be 
released from detention if the interests of justice 
permit, subject to reasonable conditions’. Here, 
reference is made to the phrase ‘reasonable 
conditions’. Arguably, conditions that result 
in discrimination of accused persons on 
account of their indigence is a far cry from 
reasonableness as envisaged in section 35(1)(f). 
This is because, rich or poor, accused persons 
should be released on bail if the interests of 
justice permit. 
This article set out to demonstrate the need 
for the criminal justice system to be serious 
about inquiries into affordability of bail, with a 
view to decolonising the system. The article 
has demonstrated that both national and 
international law lend impetus to the argument 
that a price should not necessarily be attached 
to bail, particularly where such a price makes it 
hard, or close to impossible, for the vulnerable 
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to be released. With such a high percentage 
of individuals in South Africa living under the 
poverty line, failure to conduct the necessary 
inquiry on bail affordability not only undermines 
the notion of equality but also constitutes an 
affront to the values of dignity, both being pillars 
of South Africa’s constitutionally-based free 
and democratic society. It is highly unlikely that 
the indirect penalisation of poverty through this 
practice is justifiable in terms of South Africa’s 
constitutional limitation clause under section 
36. The fact that the marginalised constitute 
a substantial percentage of those in pre-trial 
detention ought to send a signal to stakeholders 
about the implications of the failure to conduct 
an inquiry and follow the necessary procedure 
thereafter. Where, in the past, the marginalised 
in South Africa suffered the brunt of detention 
and imprisonment, it now seems history is 
repeating itself – this time clothed in the failure 
of the criminal justice system to follow the 
legal requirement to make inquiries into the 
affordability of bail for those accused of crime. 
Seemingly, this is resulting in the penalisation of 
the poor. 
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